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How do you reconcile an opinion like Edmond v Goldsmith' with
the anti-civil-libertarian positions that Richard Posner advocates in his
book Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emer-
gency?2 The book itself is self-consciously directed against a civil liber-
tarian framework. "The sharpest challenge to the approach that I am
sketching," Posner knowingly anticipates, "will come from civil liber-
tarians," by which he means those "adherents to the especially capa-
cious view of civil liberties that is often advanced in litigation and lob-
bying by the American Civil Liberties Union."3 In his book, Richard
Posner argues in defense of the use of coercive interrogation tech-
niques "up to and including torture";' in support of the National Secu-
rity Agency (NSA) program of warrantless electronic surveillance of
American citizens;' in favor of criminally punishing the dissemination
(including by the media) of classified material concerning national
security;6 and in defense of the constitutionality (though not yet the
necessity) of prohibiting extremist speech.7 By the end of the book,
Richard Posner advances a novel judicial doctrine of "national secu-
rity necessity" that would essentially extend a form of qualified im-
munity "to national security officials who violate a constitutional right
in good faith in compelling situations of necessity" as a better and
simpler alternative to presidential pardons.8
In the Edmond case, in contrast, Judge Posner enjoined the Indi-
anapolis police department from setting up effective roadblocks to
t Julius Kreeger Professor of Law and Criminology, The University of Chicago; Director,
Center for Studies in Criminal Justice.
1 183 F3d 659 (7th Cir 1999), affd, City of Indianapolis v Edmond, 531 US 32 (2000).
2 Richard A. Posner, Not a Suicide Pact: The Constitution in a Time of National Emergency
(Oxford 2006).
3 Id at 41.
4 See id at 152.
5 See id at 99-100.
6 See id at 105-11.
7 See id at 152.
8 Id at 155.
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catch drug offenders.9 The roadblocks, it seemed, had everything going
for them: they distributed the costs of enforcement evenly across mo-
torists, interfered as minimally as possible with their movement, in-
vaded only slightly their privacy interests, and, according to everyone
on the Seventh Circuit panel, produced very "high" rates of successful
searches. '° They were also randomly administered, which means that
police officers could not individually discriminate against African-
American drivers-or at least, less easily." Despite this, Posner re-
versed the lower federal court-which had not enjoined the police
practice -and put a stop to the roadblocks, resting the decision on the
arguable notion that the police did not have any "individualized suspi-
cion" to stop and question any motorist"-a legal fiction that really
makes little sense to anyone, especially to an economist or a law-and-
economics trained lawyer who conceives of reasonable suspicion in
probabilistic terms. As Judge Frank Easterbrook makes plain in his
dissenting opinion, it is extremely easy to write the decision the other
way; 3 in fact, the guiding federal precedent in roadblock cases seems
to be that the government wins and the civil libertarians lose. Judge
Posner nevertheless sided with the civil libertarians in a decision that
was affirmed by the liberal wing of the Supreme Court.
How then do we reconcile Judge Posner the author of the Ed-
mond opinion and other libertarian positions ranging from drug en-
forcement'4 to antisodomy statutes" with Richard Posner the author of
Not a Suicide Pact?
9 Edmond, 183 F3d at 666.
10 See id at 662.
11 Id at 663.
12 See id.
13 See id at 666-71 (Easterbrook dissenting).
14 Richard Posner, in his personal capacity, is substantially opposed to the war on drugs.
Posner writes, "If the resources used to wage the war were reallocated to other social projects,
such as reducing violent crime, there would probably be a net social gain." He adds that "we
normally allow people to engage in such [self-destructive] behavior if they want; it is an aspect of
liberty." See Richard Posner, The War on Drugs, The Becker-Posner Blog (Mar 20,2005), online at
httpJ/www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/03/the war-on-drug.html (visited Sept 29,2007).
1 Richard Posner favored decriminalization of homosexual sodomy before the Supreme
Court's decision in Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558 (2003), struck down Texas's homosexual sod-
omy statute. See Richard A. Posner, Sex and Reason 294-99 (Harvard 1992). Posner develops in
his work, Sex and Reason, an economic theory of sexuality that, as a descriptive matter, embraces
a rational choice perspective on sexual behavior and, from a normative perspective, adopts a
libertarian position on sexual regulation-"not to be confused," Posner emphasizes, "with either
libertine or modem liberal." Id at 3. See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: "You Are
Entering a Gay- and Lesbian-Free Zone": On the Radical Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other
(Post-) Queers. [Raising Questions About Lawrence, Sex Wars, and the Criminal Law], 94 J Crim
L & Criminol 503,513-15 (2004).
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In his book, Richard Posner offers a simple answer: the disconti-
nuity merely reflects the need to recalibrate the weights associated
with the conventional balance between personal liberty and public
security in the case of national emergencies. All constitutional analy-
ses of law enforcement programs, Posner explains, rest on a balancing
between the competing constitutional values of liberty and security. In
times of emergency, those values need to be recalibrated so that public
safety is afforded slightly greater weight. Richard Posner writes:
I have argued that the proper way to think about constitutional
rights in a time such as this is in terms of the metaphor of a bal-
ance. One pan contains individual rights, the other community
safety, with the balance needing and receiving readjustment from
time to time as the weights of the respective interests change. The
safer we feel, the more weight we place on the interest in per-
sonal liberty; the more endangered we feel, the more weight we
place on the interest in safety, while recognizing the interdepend-
ence of the two interests.'
6
A national emergency, such as a war, creates a disequilibrium
in the existing system of constitutional rights. Concerns for public
safety now weigh more heavily than before. The courts respond
by altering the balance, curtailing civil liberties in recognition
that the relative weights of the competing interests have changed
in favor of safety. This is the pragmatic response, and pragmatism
is a dominant feature not only of American culture at large but
also of the American judicial culture."
This explanation has the virtue of simplicity. What I would like to
suggest, though, is that a close reading of the Edmond opinion reflects
a slightly more complicated and technical framework than mere bal-
ancing-one that ultimately revolves around a choice concerning the
proper level of analysis to review law enforcement programs. The
framework derives from a libertarian origin and, under normal condi-
tions, tilts ever so slightly in favor of civil liberties-it ensures, for or-
dinary criminal cases, a regular structure of constitutional analysis,
including, for instance, the need for "individualized suspicion" to meet
the standard of reasonable suspicion. At the same time, though, it is
deeply pragmatic and carves out a massive exception for national se-
curity emergencies that operates predominantly by means of a specific
procedural device, namely a program-level cost-benefit analysis. This
device inevitably favors the government.
16 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact at 148 (cited in note 2).
17 Id at 147.
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The complete framework operates as follows: in ordinary crimi-
nal cases involving traditional police functions, the reasonableness of a
search is determined by the existence or nonexistence of "individual-
ized suspicion of wrongdoing." The default position protects individual
liberty, and this can only be overcome by the presence of individual-
ized suspicion. This represents a libertarian framework insofar as it
does not allow for cost-benefit analysis or pragmatic considerations:
regardless of the balance of interests, the police practice is only per-
mitted where there is individualized suspicion. In contrast, in the case
of a national emergency, the reasonableness of a search turns on an
evaluation-at the program level-of the costs and benefits of the
program. This represents a social welfare calculus that tends to favor
the government.
I interpret this framework, ultimately, as pragmatist libertarian
authoritarian style because it reveals a personal taste and inclination
on Richard Posner's part that favors law enforcement authority over
civil liberties whenever the stakes are high. These terms -libertarian,
pragmatist, and authoritarian -may seem hard to reconcile at first
blush. But I hope to make their relation, or interdependence, more
coherent over the course of this Essay.
Posner is brutally honest in his book and concedes that the
weighing of liberty and security is a metaphorical process that is en-
tirely subjective. "[T]he 'weighing,"' Posner writes, "is usually meta-
phorical. The consequences judges consider are imponderables, and
the weights assigned to them are therefore inescapably subjective.""
How and when to add weights in the case of a national emergency, it
turns out, reveals more about the judge and his or her personality than
it does about national security needs. "Each judge brings to the bal-
ancing process preconceptions that may incline him to give more
weight to inroads on personal liberty than to threat to public safety,
while another judge, bringing different preconceptions to the case,
would reverse the weights," Posner concedes. "The weights are influ-
enced by personal factors, such as temperament (whether authoritar-
ian or permissive), moral and religious values, life experiences that
may have shaped those values and been shaped by temperament, and
sensitivities and revulsions of which the judge may be quite unaware."1
What I would like to propose in this Essay, then, is to read closely
Judge Posner's opinion in Edmond against the backdrop of his book
Not a Suicide Pact, in order to interpret -a bit as one would a Ror-
schach inkblot test-the temperament, values, and sensitivities of a
18 Id at 24-25.
19 Id.
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remarkable jurist and wonderful colleague, Judge Richard Posner, on
the twenty-fifth anniversary of his accession to the federal bench.
I. INDIVIDUALIZED SUSPICION VERSUS PROGRAM-LEVEL REVIEW
In Edmond, Judge Posner, sitting as chief judge, was called upon
to decide the constitutionality of police roadblocks intended to detect
drug contraband. On six occasions between August and November
1998, the Indianapolis police department had set up roadblocks on the
city streets to catch drug offenders. The locations of these roadblocks
were determined weeks in advance based on information regarding
area crime statistics and traffic flow. The roadblocks were conducted
during the daytime and were identified with signs that read:
"NARCOTICS CHECKPOINT _ MILE AHEAD, NARCOTICS K-9
IN USE, BE PREPARED TO STOP."' At each site, approximately
thirty police officers were present, and they would stop in total a pre-
determined number of vehicles. A group of vehicles would be diverted
to the search area, and the other traffic would then be allowed to go
through until the police had finished processing the group of stopped
vehicles.2' With regard to each stop, a police officer would approach
the driver and request his or her driver's license and car registration.
The stopped cars and their passengers would then be subject to a plain
view search of the interior through the car windows, and a dog-sniffing
search of the exterior of the automobiles. According to the police, the
entire process was designed not to exceed five minutes.2
Over the course of the six roadblocks, 1,161 vehicles were
stopped. The stops produced fifty-five drug-related arrests and forty-
nine non-drug related arrests (for offenses such as driving with an
expired driver's license), resulting in a 4.74 percent drug-arrest hit rate
and an overall hit rate of 8.96 percent.
The roadblocks were perceived as successful in detecting illicit
drug and other criminal violations. Judge Posner repeatedly refers to
the resulting hit rate as "high" and adds that it is "vastly higher than,
for example, the probability of a hit as a result of the screening of em-
barking passengers and their luggage at airports." 4 Judge Posner
writes-though there is no factual basis in the record for this-that
"the deterrence of drug offenses produced by these hits advances the
strong national, state, and local policy of discouraging the illegal use of
20 Edmond, 531 US at 35-36.
21 Id at 35.
22 Id.
23 Edmond, 183 F3d at 661.
24 Id at 662.
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controlled substances."25 Judge Easterbrook similarly refers to the
program in glowing terms: "The program is spectacularly successful as
roadblocks go; 9.4% of those stopped are arrested, with the reason
equally divided between driving and drug crimes.""6 Citing the Marti-
nez-Fuerte Border Patrol case and the Sitz sobriety checkpoint case -
cases which involved hit rates of 0.12 and 1.6 percent respectively-
Easterbrook notes that "[r]oadblocks with much lower rates of success
have been held consistent with the fourth amendment.""
Though admittedly important to a cost-benefit analysis, Judge
Posner's opinion does not turn on the rate of successful searches, but
rather on the level of the reasonableness assessment-on whether the
reasonableness of any search is to be decided at the level of the entire
roadblock program or at the level of an individual stop. Judge Posner
makes this clear in the very first paragraphs of the opinion: if the court
were to adopt a program-level analysis, Posner suggests, then the court
would perform a cost-benefit analysis and the outcome would most
certainly favor law enforcement. Most program-level evaluations of
costs and benefits do. But if the court were to adopt an individual-
level assessment focused on "individualized suspicion," the outcome
would likely differ. Posner writes:
Whether the seizures effected by Indianapolis's drug roadblocks
are reasonable may depend on whether reasonableness is to be as-
sessed at the level of the entire program or of the individual stop.
If the former, these roadblocks probably are legal, given the high
"hit" rate and the only modestly intrusive character of the stops.2
In this sense, the distinction between program-level and individ-
ual-level analyses is outcome determinative. The program-level as-
sessment triggers a cost-benefit analysis which, in practically all cases,
favors law enforcement. The major cost in the case of the Indianapolis
roadblocks is the waste of time and invasion of privacy suffered by
each person stopped and questioned; other costs include the opportu-
nity cost of using those police officers on more pressing police busi-
ness-such as solving or preventing serious crimes like murder or
robbery-the equipment costs associated with setting up a barricade,
and the costs of publicizing and justifying the intervention (maybe the
25 Id (emphasis added).
26 Id at 666 (Easterbrook dissenting). I am not sure how Judge Easterbrook got to the 9.4
percent figure. Both Judge Posner and Justice O'Connor report similar search success rates of
104 motorists of a total pool of 1,161, or 8.96 percent. See Edmond, 531 US at 35; Edmond, 183
F3d at 661 (majority).
27 Edmond, 183 F3d at 666 (Easterbrook dissenting), citing United States v Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 US 543 (1976) and Michigan Department of State Police v Sitz, 496 US 444 (1990).
28 Edmond, 183 F3d at 661 (majority).
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police department had to issue a press release and conduct a press
hearing, and so forth). The benefits of the program include the detec-
tion of drug contraband, the detection of derelict drivers who either
have no registration or no license, and the deterrent effect on illicit
drug consumption associated with the publicity surrounding the pro-
gram-what Judge Posner refers to, earlier, as "the deterrence of drug
offenses produced by these hits."29 A program-level cost-benefit analy-
sis would compare the aggregated costs and benefits. As Judge Posner
suggests, at the program level the equation would likely favor the
roadblocks because of their supposedly large deterrent effects."
But an individual-level assessment would likely go the other way,
especially in cases involving randomized searches where there is no
witness identification or police intelligence. The individual-level as-
sessment requires a showing of some "individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing," and that will only exist in certain cases, such as those
where there are identifications or observations by the police. The re-
quirement of individualized suspicion does not trigger a cost-benefit
analysis and therefore does not allow for pragmatic considerations
involving the needs of law enforcement.
Judge Posner acknowledges that the program-level analysis is a
pro-government standard. Posner writes:
Because it is infeasible to quantify the benefits and costs of most
law enforcement programs, the program approach might well
permit deep inroads into privacy. In high-crime areas of Amer-
ica's cities it might justify methods of policing that are associated
with totalitarian nations. One can imagine an argument that it
would be reasonable in a drug-infested neighborhood to adminis-
ter drug tests randomly to drivers and pedestrians.'
Knowing this, Judge Posner nevertheless declares that, in conven-
tional criminal law enforcement settings, an individual-level assess-
ment is ordinarily appropriate: "[C]ourts do not usually assess reason-
ableness at the program level when they are dealing with searches
related to general criminal law enforcement" -or at least, "ordinarily"
so." Judge Posner, reviewing prior cases, finds several exceptions to
the ordinary situation. Those exceptions include, first, the case where
police officers have information that a dangerous criminal is escaping
along a certain route. Here, there is heightened risk that allows for
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preemption in favor of program-level review." Second (and this is
perhaps the most important in relation to Posner's Not a Suicide Pact)
there is an exception when law enforcement faces a terrorist threat.
Posner offers the following example:
[I]f the Indianapolis police had a credible tip that a car loaded
with dynamite and driven by an unidentified terrorist was en
route to downtown Indianapolis, they would not be violating the
Constitution if they blocked all the roads to the downtown area
even though this would amount to stopping thousands of drivers
without suspecting any one of them of criminal activity3
In this case of national emergency, the court should switch to the pro-
gram-level review. Judge Posner identifies a third exception for regu-
latory measures such as sobriety checkpoints or other randomized
search programs involving drug testing for law enforcement officers or
railroad engineers; and a fourth exception for immigration checkpoints
searching for illegal immigrants or contraband crossing the borders.5
In all these exceptional cases, Judge Posner declares, courts re-
viewing police practices should and do properly adopt a program-level
cost-benefit analysis-which, not surprisingly, results in their being
found constitutional. Thus, by sorting police practices along the lines
of traditional criminal law enforcement versus emergency and regula-
tory enforcement, Judge Posner is in effect using the choice of the
level of review to allow some roadblocks, but not others. The alterna-
tive, Posner suggests with a slip of the pen, is to either ban all or allow
all roadblocks: "The alternative would be to rule that either all road-
blocks are illegal or none are, which would be akin to punishing all kill-
ings identically because the 'objective' fact is that someone has died."'' I
say "slip of the pen" because those are not really the two alternatives,
naturally. The real alternatives are either an individual- or a program-
level review. It is only if that choice is entirely outcome determinative
that the existing alternatives become an all-or-nothing proposition.
In contrast to Judge Posner, Judge Frank Easterbrook, writing in
dissent, adopts precisely the kind of program-level analysis that ines-
capably favors law enforcement. What is required, Judge Easterbrook
writes, is an analysis of the costs and benefits of the program. There is
no distinction between traditional criminal law enforcement and regu-
latory programs, and no special exception carved for terrorism or
33 Id at 662-63, citing United States v Harper, 617 F2d 35, 40-41 (4th Cir 1980).
34 Edmond, 183 F3d at 663.
35 Id.
36 Id at 665.
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other extraordinary circumstances: the program-level analysis applies,
and it applies across the board to all roadblock cases."
II. PERSONALITY, VALUES, AND SENSIBILITIES
The first point to make, then, is that Judge Posner displays a slight
libertarian tendency. In ordinary criminal cases, where the purpose of
the police intervention is the traditional enforcement of the criminal
law, police practices are to be evaluated using an individual-level as-
sessment and require a finding of individualized suspicion. In contrast
to a program-level review, the individual-level assessment rests on a
libertarian framework, in the sense that the default position favors
individual liberty. That default can only be overcome under very strict
and precise conditions involving the existence of "individualized suspi-
cion." No cost-benefit weighing, nor any pragmatic considerations, can
overcome the liberty presumption. This in itself is libertarian-leaning.
A. Libertarian
But even more importantly, Posner embraces in Edmond the lib-
ertarian-style fiction that "individualized suspicion" operates in a bi-
nary, on/off manner, rather than along a continuum of degrees. The
truth is that suspicion is a probabilistic notion-measured along a
probability scale. We know, for instance, that the average level of sus-
picion for individuals traveling on the roads that were blocked by the
Indianapolis police was 4.74 percent for drug contraband.8 We know
this after the fact, but we know it nonetheless. It would be entirely fair
to say that for each and every one of those automobile travelers, we
had "individualized suspicion" of 4.74 percent. Richard Posner writes
that "here the roadblock is meant to intercept a completely random
sample of drivers; there is neither probable cause nor articulable sus-
picion to stop any given driver." But that, of course, is a formalistic
legal statement that is substantially inaccurate: for each driver, there
was a 4.74 percent chance that they were carrying drugs. That is a very
specific and articulable level of suspicion.
This notion of an "articulable level of suspicion" is no different
than in the classic case of witness identification. So, for instance, if a
victim testifies that the perpetrator was a University of Chicago
graduate student who spoke French, and there are, say, 450 graduate
students at The University of Chicago who are French speakers out of
37 Id at 668 (Easterbrook dissenting).
38 Id at 661 (majority) (reporting 55 drug-related arrests out of 1,161 vehicles stopped, or
0.0474).
39 Id at 663.
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a student body of 9,000, then we can easily conclude that our "indi-
vidualized suspicion" to question fluent French-speaking grad stu-
dents reaches 5 percent. We can quantify and establish before ques-
tioning our exact level of "individualized suspicion" and determine
whether it meets some minimum threshold to justify detaining and
questioning any graduate students.
The only difference between these two cases is a temporal one:
we do not know the level of individualized suspicion in the roadblock
case until after we have begun to conduct some stops and visual and
canine searches at the roadblocks. (And even here, since this involves
a random sample of motorists, we can be pretty confident that we will
have similar levels of suspicion at similarly selected sites in the near
future. We could also obtain this information through research or sur-
veys.) In the second case, we know from the witness identification the
level of suspicion and can use that to justify our stops and questioning.
In both cases, we can easily determine the level of suspicion. In each
case, we can find the actual level of "individualized suspicion."
In other words, there was "individualized suspicion" in the Ed-
mond case and Judge Posner could have found that the individual-
level standard was satisfied. What he meant to say, of course, is that
there was not enough individualized suspicion, but here too he could
easily have found that there was. The courts have never established a
percentage requirement for individualized suspicion or probable
cause, and as Judge Easterbrook notes in dissent, individualized suspi-
cion has been found at far less than 4.74 percent. Judge Posner's re-
fusal to find it here reflects a libertarian bias.
As Judge Posner himself must recognize, conclusions about the
sufficiency of the evidence of individualized suspicion, just like con-
clusions about the costs and benefits of law enforcement initiatives,
are purely metaphorical. Posner concedes that "it is infeasible to quan-
tify the benefits and costs of most law enforcement programs.Y4
Judges in these types of cases have no real clue how search success
rates compare, what level of success should be expected, or what the
benefits of these law enforcement programs are. They have no good
evidence to assess hit rates, nor do they know what the hit rates really
mean in terms of the quality of the searches-or, more importantly,
whether the searches have any deterrent impact.
So, for instance, it is worth noting that the 4.74 percent drug hit
rate-or, for that matter, the 8.96 percent overall hit rate including
minor traffic violations -is not really "spectacular," as Judge Easter-
40 Id at 662.
41 Idat661.
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brook suggests. 2 Hit rates from other law enforcement interventions
have been far greater. For example, the Maryland state patrol between
January 1995 and January 1999 achieved drug hit rates along Mary-
land's 1-95 corridor of 32 percent with regard to white drivers and 34
percent with regard to African-American drivers.0 In Missouri for the
year 2001, police traffic stops achieved drug hit rates-that is drugs
only, not including faulty drivers' licenses-of 19.7, 12.3, and 9.8 per-
cent respectively for whites, African Americans, and Hispanics." A
1982 Department of Justice study of airport searches using a drug-
courier profile reported forty-nine successful searches based on
ninety-six total searches, for a hit rate of 51.04 percent.4' A govern-
ment report analyzing New York City stop-and-frisks, prepared in
1999, revealed average hit rates (stop-to-arrest) of approximately 13.7
percent in situations found to present reasonable suspicion." In the
abstract, devoid of any comparative evidence about search success
rates in other contexts, the 4.74 percent drug hit rate may well seem
"high" or even "spectacularly successful"; however, that may be an
artifact of judicial decisionmaking with no data, a perennial problem
in constitutional criminal procedure.7
The judges in the Edmond case also have no idea what the qual-
ity of the successful searches was at those roadblocks. The Maryland
data from the 1990s are revealing in this regard. Though the hit rates
there seem high-seven times higher than in the Edmond case-it
turns out that 84 percent of the successful searches revealed only trace
or personal-use amounts of drugs. Even worse, 68 percent of the suc-
cessful searches were for trace or personal-use quantities of marijuana
only." That's hardly impressive, and for all we know, the same type of
"success" is being achieved at the Edmond roadblocks. Moreover,
there is no good evidence that detecting trace or personal-use quanti-
ties of drugs on drivers -especially marijuana-is going to have any
effect on drug markets and drug dealing. Posner's finding mentioned
above-that "the deterrence of drug offenses produced by these hits
42 Id at 666 (Easterbrook dissenting).
43 Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U Chi L
Rev 1275, 1292 (2004).
44 Idat 1293.
45 Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Profiling, Policing and Punishing in an Actuar-
ialAge 15-16 (Chicago 2007).
46 Tracey L. Meares and Bernard E. Harcourt, Foreword: Transparent Adjudication and Social
Science Research in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 90 J Crim L & Criminol 733,789 (2000).
47 For an argument proposing increased use of social science evidence in constitutional
criminal procedure, see generally id.
48 Harcourt, 71 U Chi L Rev at 1320 (cited in note 43).
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advances the strong national, state, and local policy of discouraging
the illegal use of controlled substances 4 1 -is entirely speculative, per-
haps even fantastic. There is really no good reason to believe that
catching trace amounts of marijuana in automobile ashtrays in Indi-
anapolis is going to discourage drug use at the national level.
For all these reasons, Judge Posner's conclusion in Edmond re-
veals a subjective libertarian orientation. This is clear by contrast to
Judge Easterbrook. In his dissent, Easterbrook deploys the type of
program-level analysis that necessarily weighs against the civil rights
claim. Easterbrook would have ruled against the constitutional claim
based on this simple, four-part syllogism: (1) "First, the privacy interest
of drivers is diminished relative to the interests of people at home or
in the office"; (2) "Second, the invasion of privacy at a roadblock is
slight"; (3) "Third, a small invasion can be justified by aggregate suc-
cess.... Martinez-Fuerte holds a probability under 1% will do for a
roadblock, and in Indianapolis the probability is much greater"; and
(4) fourth, "the principal risk in allowing stops of vehicles without per-
son-specific cause is that the officers will abuse the discretion thus
conveyed.'," The overwhelming precedent in this area of the law,
Easterbrook argues, is that the civil libertarian loses. Judge Posner,
however, refuses to move the analysis to the program level. It would
require an exception or an emergency, and, Posner finds, "no such ur-
gency has been shown here."'1
B. Pragmatist
At the same time, Judge Posner is avowedly pragmatic: his liber-
tarian streak may hold in the case of ordinary criminal law enforce-
ment, but not in times of national emergency. Urgent times call for
urgent measures: "When urgent considerations of the public safety
require compromise with the normal principles constraining law en-
forcement, the normal principles may have to bend," Judge Posner
declares. "The Constitution is not a suicide pact."
5 2
This represents the pragmatist or practical-minded approach that
Judge Posner advocates for constitutional analysis writ large. Rather
than treat the Constitution as wooden and inflexible, Posner uses de-
vices, such as the existence of a state of exception, to try to protect
49 Edmond, 183 F3d at 662 (majority) (emphasis added).
50 Id at 669-70 (Easterbrook dissenting) (citations omitted). Easterbrook considers one
other factor-the likelihood of abuse of discretion but, finding that it is not present here, con-
cludes that "the concern that led to Prouse is missing, and the first three considerations show
that the roadblock is reasonable." Id at 670.
51 Id at 663 (majority).
52 Id.
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society. Posner regards himself as a "practical-minded judge" putting
forward "a more flexible, practical approach."53 His book, Not a Sui-
cide Pact, he tells us, reflects just this approach. The book is "about the
marginal adjustments in [constitutional] rights that practical-minded
judges make when the values that underlie the rights-values such as
personal liberty and privacy-come into conflict with values of equal
importance, such as public safety, suddenly magnified by the onset of a
national emergency. '' m
In this regard, the individual structure of Posner's arguments in
Not a Suicide Pact is similar to the form of analysis in Edmond: times
of national emergency create an exception to normal constitutional
review and, in such times, judges and public citizens must assess en-
forcement measures using a program-level cost benefit analysis, rather
than an individual-level assessment. Thus, in Not a Suicide Pact, Rich-
ard Posner adopts a program-level analysis when he reviews the con-
stitutionality of random searches of subway riders' bags in New York
City, dragnet police stops in the case of a terrorist threat, warrantless
eavesdropping outside the FISA framework, and other counterterror-
ism measures."
C. Authoritarian
Pragmatic libertarianism may strike many as an oxymoron-
especially more staunch civil libertarians on both the Left and the
Right. This is understandable. To many libertarians, protection of civil
liberties is most needed during times of crisis. During ordinary or
normal periods of democratic existence, we can rely more easily on
reasonable public discourse or even educated public opinion. It is
when the public imagination is enflamed by national crises that we
need, more than ever, a civil liberties framework.
But the introduction of pragmatic concerns does not necessarily
vitiate the libertarian perspective. The key question becomes: what
flavor of pragmatism? The fact is, the pragmatist impulse can come in
two very different styles: one that still puts law enforcement measures
to a serious test -in other words, one where the outcome is not prede-
termined from the turn to program-level analysis-and another, more
authoritarian approach, where the mere placement of the measure
within the category of the national emergency by necessary implica-
tion produces a foreseeable result. If that foreseeable result always fa-
vors law enforcement, I would label the approach "pro-government."
53 Posner, Not a Suicide Pact at 9 (cited in note 2).
54 Id at 1.
55 See id at 90-93.
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Posner calls it "authoritarian," as when he writes that "[t]he weights
are influenced by personal factors, such as temperament (whether
authoritarian or permissive). 56 Following Posner's lead, then, I will
call this style "authoritarian."
This, then, is what makes Richard Posner a pragmatic authoritar-
ian libertarian. It should come as little surprise that Judge Posner, in
his capacity as author of Not a Suicide Pact, essentially finds for the
government across an array of law enforcement techniques -ranging
from unwarranted wiretaps to the use of coercive interrogation in-
cluding torture. As long as the program has some conceivable benefit,
given the extraordinary costs associated with a terrorist attack, the
measures become appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Richard Posner's unique brand of libertarianism-pragmatic and
authoritarian -combines, in a curious way, deep distrust of govern-
ment intervention in economic matters, sincere belief in government
incompetence, and yet unbounded trust that the government will not
abuse or mismanage its augmented enforcement responsibilities dur-
ing a time of national security emergency. In contrast to pragmatic
libertarians on the Left, Richard Posner is not skeptical of the gov-
emment's ability to properly safeguard sensitive or personal informa-
tion, to limit the use of excess force, or to avoid abusing these new-
found powers. He sides, ultimately and almost unquestioningly, with
the government and its law enforcement apparatus in difficult times.
It is possible, on this view, that civil liberties are only left safe-
guarded when it hardly matters. And that, even there, the protections
may be extremely precarious. Judge Posner observes, in the final para-
graph of the Edmond opinion, that the roadblocks in Indianapolis
could have been justified under the national emergency exception:
The high hit rate of Indianapolis's roadblock scheme suggests
that Indianapolis has placed the roadblocks in areas of the city in
which drug use approaches epidemic proportions; and if so the
roadblocks might be justified by reference to the second excep-
tion, as illustrated by such cases as Maxwell (involving a flurry of
drive-by shootings), Norwood (threat of violence at a rally of mo-
torcycle gangs), and Williams (Indian insurrection)."
In other words, the situation in Indianapolis (with hit rates about seven
times lower than in Maryland) was apparently approaching crisis pro-
56 Id at 25.
57 183 F3d at 666.
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portions, similar in scale to the present terrorist threat, and Judge Pos-
ner may well have approved the roadblocks on those grounds.
But still, Judge Posner did not do that. He could have, but he did
not. Which leaves Judge Richard Posner, on this Rorschach inkblot test,
still a bit of a libertarian, always pragmatic, and staunchly authoritarian.
